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CHAPTER I 
THE BANK CAPITAL PROBLEM 
In recent years the problem of commercial bank capital adequacy 
has received renewed attention from bank analysts. Mayne has shown 
that supervisory attempts to influence capital levels are net always 
effective and that many banks have continuously resisted examiner per-
. . . 1 1 suas1on to ra1se more cap~ta . ew dimensions have also been added 
to the problem by the rapid expansion of bank holding companies and 
by the increased willingness of management to inject long-term debt 
into the capital structure of many banks. Watson has noted several 
additional reasons why capital adequacy has become a factor of in-
d 
2 crease concern. First,. the loan to deposit ratios of commercial 
banks have become significantly higher than they were a few years ago. 
Second there has been a decline in the percentage of total assets 
made up by investment portfolios and banks have also pledged a substan-
tial portion of their securities portfolio to secure public deposits. 
The pledging requirement prohibits the sale of securities to meet loan 
demands or deposit withdrawals; therefore, these pledged assets are no 
longer available as a source of liquidity. Third, the subordinated 
1Lucille S. Mayne, "How Federal Bank Supervisors Affect Bank 
Capital," Banking 6 (December 1973): 36. 
2Justin T. Watson, "'A Regulatory View of Capital Adequacy,u 
Journal of Bank Research 6 (Autumn 1975): 170. 
1 
2 
debenture cannot perform the same functions as equity and is thus con-
sidered by many to be a lower quality capital. Finally, in many 
instances there has been excessive use of purchased funds to support 
banking operations. 
In order to examine the impact of recent banking trends on 
capital adequacy, it is appropriate to first identify the intended 
functions of bank capital. The functions or purposes of bank capital 
which are generally agreed upon are the following: (1) to acquire the 
necessary fixed assets of the banking business (e.g., building, 
mach~nery, and equipment), (2) to absorb losses and to protect the 
depositors if the bank is closed,, (3) to support credit risks; both 
federal and State of Florida regulations limit loans and lines of 
credit based on a percentage of a bank's capital, (4) capital stock 
is the represe tation of private ownership. Crosse and Henpel have 
stated that the primary function of capital is "to reassure the public 
and especially bank supervisors that the bank is in a position to with-
stand whatever strains may be placed on it. Adequate capital serves 
to keep banks open so that they may be able to absorb losses out of 
future earnings rather than out of capital funds themselves."
1 
From examination of the historical record it is evident that 
bankers have heen· gradually decreasing capital levels of their banks. 
Regulators have probably tended to be conservative in setting appro-
priate capital adequacy standards and bank management has attempted 
~oward D. Crosse and George H. Hempel, Management Policies for 
Connnercial Banks (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973), 
p. 71. 
to boost profits by reducing equity capital. Bank examiners would 
probably be more comfortable with excess levels of capital since they 
are concerned with the safety of the industry and bank failure draws 
criticism of the regulatory agency from the public. However, bank 
profits result from the differential between lending and borrowing 
rates and the lower the capital-asset ratio, the lower this differen-
tial need be in order to achieve a normal return on equity capital. 
The furt er bankers can permit capital-asset ratios to dwindle, 
driving up profitability, the happier the stockholders will be pro-
vided they aren't disturbed by the increased risk. 
The primary objecti e of bank regulation is the prevention of 
bank failure. One of the most important indicators of a bank's 
financial condition to the regulatory authority is capital adequacy; 
it occupies their greatest effort in the supervisory process. 1 How-
3 
ever, since the deposits of most individuals are insured by the Federal 
Dep,osit Insurance Corporation, small depositors need not concern them-
selves lvith the problems of capital adequacy.. Capital levels are of no 
concern as long as deposits are insured and therefore, only companies 
with large uninsured deposits may be concerned about bank capital. But 
if bank failures occur due to inadequate levels of capital then public 
confidence in the commercial banking system may suffer and society as a 
whole will be penalized. Commercial banks are the primary legal money 
creating institutions in the economy, they provide a major portion of 
1Thomas G. Gies and Vincent R. Apilado, "Capital Adequacy and 





















STATE COMMERCIAL BANKS IN FLORIDA 
(In Thousand of Dollars) 
TOTAL TOTAL CAPITAL 
NUMBER TOTAL CAPITAL TOTAL ASSETS TOTAL 
OF BANKS ASSETS ACCOUNTS (IN PERCENT) DEPOSITS 
21 $ 1,692 $ 666 39 $ 974 
22 4,510 1~006 22 3,408 
41 14,,338 3,222 22 10,291 
113 27,599 5,607 20 2t)' 884 
192 42,656 9,811 23 30,527 
212 114,374 13,272 12 95,349 
271 539,101 33,427 6 50.1,553 
151 92,928 16,422 18 70,235 
102 64,276 9,768 15 53,552 
14 116,169 14,233 12 101,545 
12 450,838 20,135 4 430,256 
130 619,,824 37,603 6 580,607 
146 1,138,114 67,726 6 1,064,763 
181 1,781,837 139,368 8 1,620,185 
239 2 571,685 216,444 8 2,310,384 
282 5,,603,445 425,9 45 8 4,996,082 
449 11,757,147 989,185 8 10,346 ,695 
448 12,662,068 1,053,064 8 11,417,766 
SOURCE· Data adapted from Florida, Office of Comptroller, 
Annual Report of the Division of Banking (Tallahassee, 
1976), p. 9. 
4 
5 
the investment funds acquired by the economy and they also have 
primary responsibility for effecting an efficient payments m~echanism. 
If the public felt that its deposits were vulnerable to loss, many 
depositors would want to hold their wealth in the form of currency. 
Banks would then be denied a most important source of funds and the 
economy would be denied bank services which are vital to modern 
business trade. This is the reason bank capital levels should concern 
the general public as well as bankers and why supervisory authorities 
attempt to identify banks with inadequate capital. 
The following statement is a pre' cis of the bank capital problem: 
The capital~zation problem has become confused with the question 
of bank liquid~ty. Indeed, it sometimes appears that capital is re-
garded as something held in the bank to meet the demands of depositors. 
othing could be furthe from the truth. The main issue in connection 
ith bank capital transcending such peripheral problems as the correct 
ratio or the character of bank assets, is whether or not we are suffi-
cien ly concerned about preserving the present unit system of privately 
owned banks. Serio s quest1.ons are bound to be raised when the legal 
owners of a bank permit their equity in the enterprise to shrink so 
drastical y that they have little stake in sound banking. They have 
degeneratea to the level of self-appointed allocators of a large and 
v ·tal segment of the nation's resources. If the enterprise happens to 
be profitab 'e, the returns to the bankers in these situations are un-
deservedly large. If on the other hand, losses are incurred they are 
limited to the amount of a small investment. To stretch the situation 
to, but not beyond, the breaking point appears to be the fond hope of 
bank owners who are disposed to view with complacency the decline in 
the capital ratio. Continuance of this situation is bound to breed 
suggestions that dilution of the private equity in banks has reached a 
point requiring the management of banking be socialized. They (the 
bankers) must realize that the erosion of capital may unwittingly cause 
them to lose control of their banking establishments. 1 
1E. H. Cramer "The Philosophy of Bank Capitalization," Journal 
of Finance 6 (March 1951): 62-65, quoted in Basil J. Moore, An 
Introduction to the Theory of Finance (Free Press: New York, 1968), 
p. 213. 
CHAPTER II 
LAWS GOVERNING BANK CAPITAL 
Minimum amounts of capital are specified and required under 
Florida law for the establishment of a state chartered bank. Origi-
nally, minimum amounts of capital were designed to provide the neces-
sary levels for adequate assur3nce of safe banking practice, but as the 
banking system developed in this country,. the size of the deposits in 
individual banks expanded, a larger proportion of earning assets were 
made up of loans and the legally defined minimum amount of capital 
became less of an assurance of capital adequacy. Crosse and Henpel 
tate that these legal requirements have little real significance for 
bank·ng or bank regulation today. They explain that most state laws 
'w re e acted at a time when banks were much smaller. They have not 
been revised upward largely because the determination of capital 
adequacy has, in fact ., become a matter of administrative judgement 
rather than definitive law."1 
Florida law stipulates minimum levels of capital stock for state 
chartered banks based upon the population of the community in which 
the bank will b located: 
The cap·tal stock of a state bank or trust company shall be in 
such amounts as the department (State Department of Banking) shall 
1Howard D. Crosse and George H. Hempel, Management Policies for 
Commercial Banks (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973), P· 74. 
6 
de·em adequate,, but not less than the following aggregate amounts, 
based upon the population of the community in which the bank or 
trust company will be locat.ed according to the latest official 
census: 
7 
(a , Twenty-five thousand dollars if the population of the community 
in which the bank or trust company will he located does not 
~exceed five thousand and fifty thousand dollars if the popula-
tion of the community in whieh the bank will be loeated does 
not exceed ten thousand •. 
(b) One hundred thousand dollars if the population of th ~e community 
in which the bank or trust company will be located exceeds ten 
thousand, but does, not exceed fifty thousand. 
(c) Two hundred thousand dollars if the population •.. exceeds fifty 
thousand. 
(d) Three hundred thousand doll ars if the population .. .• exceeds two 
hundred thousand.! 
The Florida Banking Code also limits the ability of state 
chartered banks to make changes in capital: 
o state bank or trust company shall reduce its outstanding capital 
stock without first obtaining the consent of the Commi~sion (State 
Co~ssioner of Banking) 2 
Legal provisions for membership in the Federal Reserve Syst.em 
specify capital requirements with broader implications than the capital 
provisions for state chartering. The United States Code, conc,erning 
capital stock required as a condition precedent to membership, 
provides. 
No applying bank shall be admitted to membership unless it 
possesses capital stock and surplus which, in the judgement of the 
Board of Governors of the F'ederal Reserve System, are adequate in 
relation to the character and condition of its assets .and to its 
existing and pros:pective deposit liabilities and other corporate 
responsibilities"' Provided, that no bank engaged in the business 
of receiving deposits othe.r than trust funds., which do ,es not 
possess capital stock and surplus in amount equal to that which 
would be required for the establishment of a national banking . 
association in the places in which it is located, shall be admitted 
1Banking Code. Florida Statutes, Vol. 2, Chapter 659.04. 
2Ibid ., Chapter 659.10. 
to membership unl ~ess it is, or has been approved for d,eposit 
insurance under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. The capital 
stock of a state membe.r b .ank shall n~ot be reduced except with 
the prior consent of the Board.l 
Membership in the Federal Reserve System gives the agency super-
visory authority and responsibility for determing capital adequacy 
under Regulation H of the Board of Governors: 
If at any time, in the lJ.ght of all the circumstances,. the 
aggregate amount of a member stat.e bank's net capital and 
surplus funds appears to be inadequate, the bank, within such 
period as shall be deemed by the Board to be reasonable for 
this purpose, shall increase the amount thereof to an amount 
which in the judgement of the Board shall be adequate in 
relation to the character and condition of its assets and to 
J..ts deposit liabil1ties and other corporate responsibilities. 2 
The application of nonmember banks for insured status under the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Act prov'ides that "any state nonmember bank, 
upon appl cation to and examination by the corporation and approval by 
the Board of Dire ~ctors, may become an insur~ed bank. 113 In approving 
8 
the application of any state nonmember bank the following factors shall 
be given consideration: 
The financial history and condition of the bank ., the adequacy of 
its capital structur ~e, its future earnings prospects, the general 
character of its. management, the convenience and needs of the 
c ~ommunity to be served by the bank, and whether or not its corpo-
ra.t ~e powers ar·e consistent with the purposes of this chapter. 4 
A further provis,1on concerning capital under the Insurance Act 
1 Banks and Banking. U.S. Code, Title 12, Sec. 329. 
2conditions. o,f M~embership, 12 C. F .R .. 208.7 (1952) . 
.3 B.anks and Banking. u.s. Code, Title 12, Sec. 1815. 
4 
and Banking. u.s., Code~ Title l? Sec. 1816 .. Banks _, 
No insured state nonmember bank shall, without prior consent of 
the Corporation, reduce the amount or retire any part of its com-
mon or p~referred capital stock, or retire any part of its capital 
notes or debentures.l 
1Ibid., sec. 1838. 
9 
CHAPTER III 
EVOLUTION OF THE BANK HOLDING COMP'ANY 
Early history in American banking was a time when branching was 
considered a normal means of providing bank services to a community. 
Branch banking in Florida was first authorized in 1889 but the Act of 
1913 abolished branches and prohibited the establishment of a bank or 
trust company without the authorization of the State Comptroller. In 
the late 1800's branching by national banks was prohibited and many 
other states either lilrited or prohibit ~ed branching. Many banks were 
then faced with the difficulty of finding a means through which to 
grow and expand, the means became the common ownership of independent 
banks. Early cl~evelopments therefor~e, provided a prec~edent for the 
formation of multi-bank holding companies. 
A bank holding company is defined as any corporation, partner-
ship, association or similar organization which directly or indirectly 
owns , 1 eontrols, or has, power to vote 25 per eentum of voting securities 
of a bank. 1 The eorporation owns the controlling stock in the constit-
uent bank and provides managerial services to the bank in an attempt 
to improve its performance. A holding company aff1.liated bank retains 
its ~own charter, o~fficers, board of directors and capital structure as 
do independent banks. Although bank affiliates of the holding company 
1Banks and Banking . U .. S. Code, Title 12, sec .. 1841. 
10 
11 
are managed by their own d1.rectors and offic,ers, the parent company 
provides supervision and assistance concerning op ~erating policy.. Hold-
ing comp_anies differ from individual banks in that they do not fall 
under the general banking laws of the states or the nation, however 
every bank whether affiliated or independent is subject to the laws, 
under which it was organized and chartered. 
The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 was the first effort by 
Congress to' control the multi-unit banking movement. Under the 1'956 
Act each bank holding ~co~mpany was required to register with the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System information concerning: 
financial condit -·on and operations, management and intercompany rela-
. h . f th . . d . t ub ., d . . 1 t~ons 1ps o . e parent assoc1at1an an 1 s s s1 1ar1es. The Act 
also c ~ontain.ed a blanket prohibit· on concerning holding eompany int ~er ~est 
in. nonbank.ing organizations,, it stat,ed that no bank holding company 
shall acquire d"rect or indirect ownership or control of any voting 
shares of any company wh1ch is not a bank. 2 Approval of the Board was 
r ~equired before any holding company could acquire direct or indirect 
ownership o~r control any voting shares of any bank if, after such 
acquisition, such company would directly or indirectly own or control 
. 3 
mor~e than five per centum of the voting shares of such bank. In 
every case the Board was instructed to take into consideration the 
1 k -Ban s and Banking. 
2Ibid., sec. 1843. 
3 Ibid., se,c. 1842. 
U.~. Code, Title 12, sec. 1844. 
12 
following factors for determination of application for approval: 4 
(1) financial and managerial resources, (2) future prospects of the 
bank coocerned, and (3) the convenience and needs of the community to 
be served. 
On December 31, 1970,, the B~ ank Holding Company Act of 1956 was 
amended in order to include in its coverag,e holding companies control-
ling only one bank and t .o p~ermit holding organizations to enter into 
nonbanking activities closely related to hanking. The Board of 
Governors was assigned the responsibility of administering the provi-
sions of the Amendments so that all bank holding, companies would 
operat ~e under the same prohibition of their nonbanking activiti~es. 
The Board's approval is required for the establishment of a holding 
company operation and the Hoard now also has the responsibility to 
det ~ermine the extent of participation of holding companies in activi-
tie.s clos ~ely related to banking. In determining whether a particular 
activity is a proper i.ncident to banking or controlling banks the 
Board was directed, by the Amendment, to consider whether its pe.rfor-
mance by an affiliate of a holding company can reasonably be expected 
to produce benefit.s to the public, such as greater convenience, 
increased competition, or gains in efficiency~ that outweigh possible 
adverse ffects such as undue c~oncentra.tion of resources, decrease.d or 
unfair competition conflict of interest, or unsound banking practices.
2 
Therefore, today holding enterprises are permitted to own shares in 
1 - Ibid., sec. 1842. 
2Banks and Banking. U.S. Code, Title 12, sec. 1843. 
13 
companies whose activities are either closely related to bankings' 
functions of holding deposits and lending money or are part of operat-
1 ing a bank .. 
The effect of the 1970 Amendment was to open the door for both 
multi- and one-bank organization to engage in a broader range of 
activ1ties. Although heightened competition, potential economies of 
organization and an improved quality of management are often cited as 
the motives for the liberalized policy, damage to the welfare of the 
public (e.g a reduced competitive environment) is possible as a 
res lt of concentrat1ng bank resources in a small group of holding 
co panies . A bill now in Congressional Committee, the "Competition 
in Banking Act of 1977," would prohibit bank mergers or acquisitions 
if t e parent bank or holding company would thereafter control more 
than 20 percent of the banking assets in a particular state except 
where essentia to prevent a bank failure and where no feasible, less 
anticompetitive, alternative solution were available.
2 
The Bill 
"tself implies that the present explosive growth of bank holding 
companies is unfavorable and proposes to limit acquisitions on the 
basis of statewide concentration 
1see Table 1 for a summary of activities approved and denied by 
the Board. 
2George . Le Maistre, "Competition in Banking Act of 1977", 
Florida Banker, April 1978, p. 18. 
14 
TABLE 1 
BANK HOLDING COMPANY 
Activiti-es APPROVED by the Board 
of Governors 
1.. Dealer in bankers' acceptances, 
2 ortgage company 
3 • Finance c ~ompany 
4. Credit card company 
5. Factoring company 
6. Op ating an industrial bank 
7. Servic~ng loans 
8 Tr st company 
9 Ad iser to Real Estates invest-
me t trusts and other investment 
companies 
10. Genera , economic information 
an advice 
11 . Portfolio investment advice 
12. Full pay-out leasing of personal 
property 
13 . ' ull pay out leasing of real 
pr p ~erty 
14 . Community welfare investments 
15 . Bookkeeping and data processing 
services 
16. Insurance ag,ent or broker in 
connecti,on with credit extensions 
17. Underwriting credit life and 
c edit ac ~ciden t and health 
insurance 
18 Courier service 
19. Management consulting to non-
affiliated banks 
20. Sale of travelers checks 
21. Bullion broker 
Activities DENIED by the Board 
of Governors 
1. Equity funding (combined 
sale of mutual funds and 
insuranc~e) 
2. Underwriting general life 
insurance 
3. Real estate brokerage 
4. Land development 
5. Real estate syndication 
6. General management consult-
ing 
7. Property management 
TABLE 2 
FLORIDA MUL,TI-BANK HOLDING COMPANIES 
LISTED IN ORDER OF COMBINED DEPOSITS 
DECEMBER 31, 1976 
(Millions) 
1 Southeast Banking Corp. 
2. Barnett Banks of Fl~orida, Inc. 
3 Sun Banks of Florida, Inc. 
4. Flagship Banks, Inc. 
5. Florida ational Banks 
6. Atlant1c Bancorporation 
7. F~rst Florida Banks 
8. Landmark Banking 
9 ,, Ellis Bankiug Corp. 
10. Century Banks, Inc. 
11. Pan American Bancshares 
12. Exchange Bancorporation 
13. First Bancshares of Florida 
14.. City ational Bank Gorp. 
15. Southwest Florida Banks, Inc. 
16. First ifarine Banks 
17 Florida Commerical Banks 
~ 8. First State Banking Corp. 
19. American Bancshares, Inc. 
20 F rst Bankers Corp. 
21. Communit Banks of Florida 
22 ., Popular Baneshares 
23 Florida Bancshares, Inc . 
24. Florida Coast Banks, Inc. 
25. Combanks Corporation 
26. American Banks of Florida, Inc .. 
27.. Cent-ral Bancorp. ,, Inc. 
28. Jefferson Bancorp. 
29. Royal Trust Company 
30. North Florida Bancshares ,, Inc. 












































































































SOURCE: Allen C. Ewing and Co., Florida Bank Holding Companies 
(Jacksonville,. Florida: Allen C. Ewing and Co., 1977), 
p. 4. 
CHAPTER IV 
RISK AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
The riskiness of a business can be defined in terms of the rela-
tive ariability of net operating income.. When considering the riski-
ess of a particular firm it is important to consider that company's 
level of diversification, since the diversified firm may be expected 
to exp rie c.e more stable profits than would its subdivisions operating 
along. The possibility of such risk reduction is one of the main 
motivating factors fundamental to corporate diversification. 1 A 
hold.ng company can diversify its operation, that is, a holding company 
may engage in other businesses in addition to commercial banking. If 
these companies have less than perfect positive correlation of returns, 
th operating risk of the holding company is reduced relative to bank-
ing alone. The relevant question then becomes: Do bank holding 
companies der1ve sufficient benefits from diversification into related 
fields to reduce the lev,el of risk in affiliated banks, or does holding 
company affiliation increase exposure.? 
Because banks function under the supervision of regulatory 
agencies their operation is held to be generally less risky than 
related nonbanking operations.. Since consumer finance companies lend 
1James R. McGuigan and R. Charles Moyer, Managerial Economics: 
Private and Public Sector Decision Analysis (Hinsdale: Dryden Press, 
1975), p. 455. 
16 
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to customers who are higher credit risks, the lending of these institu-
tions have a higher risk of default. This points out that bankholding 
company qperations may be subjected to greater operating risk than 
banking along; however, the ability of holding companies to diversify 
and hold a portfolio of earning assets may reduce variability in their 
earnings. Since each industry has its own characteristic cyclical 
pattern, a diversified firm may expect its earnings to be more stable 
than if it e11gaged exclusively in one specific operation. 
In the case of a bank holding company, diversification consists 
of combining activities with less than perfect positive correlation 
in order to reduce risk. The expected return of the consolidated 
a~tiv.ties is the weighted average of the expected return of the 
enterp~rises co prising the holding company. The expected return of 




E(x) = l: xiRi 
i=l 
E(x) = expected return of the holding company. 
xi = percent of total holding company assets 
represented by firm i. 
Ri = expected return from firm i. 
The variance of the holding company's return can be expressed: 
n 
Var(rh) == L 
i=l 
n 
E Xi Xj Pij Gi Gj 
j =l 
18 
Var(Ib) - variance in holding company return. 
xi = participation level or proportion of 
total holding company assets represented 
by firm i. 
xj = participation level or proportion of 
total holding company assets represented 
by firm j . 
pij = correlation coefficient between firm i 
and firm j . 
6i = standard deviation of return from firm i. 
6j =standard deviation of return from firm j. 
The variability in returns to holding companies depends therefore 
upon the standard deviation of returns and the participation level 
represente by each subsidiary. The correlation between subsidiary 
ct"viti s also plays an important role in reducing risk; the lower the 
oef cient of correlation, the better the risks offset each other and 
the smaller he risk inherent in the consolidated firm. 1 
The primary objective of financial management should be to max-
imize the wealth of the firms common shareholders or maximize the value 
of the owners' interest in the firm. The financial manager affects the 
value of a corporation's stock by controlling the level of risk in-
herent in the firm and by influencing the determinants of profit-
ability. Both the riskiness and the profitability of the company are 
determined by the company's liquidity position and the proportion of 
1For a more indepth treatment of portfolio risk and diversifi-
cation see Tack C. Francis and Stephen H. Archer, Portfolio Analysis 
(Englewood Cliffs:. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971) . 
19 
debt employed. The price of connnon stock is a function of the share-
holder's risk preferences and his expectations of earnings from the 
firm's operation . Risk is the probability that a given return will be 
lower than the anticipated return; the tighter the probability distri-
bution of expected future returns, the smaller the risk of a particular 
investment. If the investor is to tolerate additional risk, 
incr ~easingly higher expected returns on investments are required to 
compensate the investor. The basis of this risk aversion is the 
principle of diminishing marginal utility of income. 
bus ness firm employs financial leverage when it issues debt or 
aps an outside source of funds for which it pays a specific fixed 
charge. Financial leverage causes earnings per share to change by a 
greater percentage than changes in its earnings before interest and 
ta es (EBIT). When the return on assets increases, the return to the 
common shareholders increase more than proportionately, leverage is 
said to be favo able and when the return from assets declines, earnings 
per share ill dec ease more than proportionately; thus, leverage is 
unfavorable. The greater the proportion of debt in the capital 
structure of a bank or a holding company, the greater the rate of re-
turn to common shareholders providing that EBIT exceeds total interest 
payments. 
Financial leverage magnifies the fluctuations in earnings avail-
able to common equity. With the employment of debt a bank automati-
cally assumes a higher level of risk exposure, because of the greater 
dispersion of possible returns. Debt commits the bank to a fixed 
interest obligati,on that must be paid, re.gardless of the level of 
20 
earnings and as debt comes due, cash is required to repay the debt. 
Higher amounts of debt increase the variability of earnings and the 
risk of bankruptcy. The greater the dependence upon debt in the 
capital structure, the wider the dispersion in possible earnings per 
sha e , and the greater the risk of cash insolvency. 
Holding companies disguise the risk involved in the financial 
1 veragi g of banks through a process known as double leveraging. A 
holdi g company can sell a debenture or debt instrument, then use the 
proceeds to make equity investments and acquire subsidiaries. If a 
re ulato agency requests an affiliated bank to increment their 
equ"ty capi al the parent company can simply borrow to meet the 
equest and use the borrowed funds to purchase new shares of common 
k ' db h . b k
1 
stoc 1ss e y t e respect1ve an . In the process the bank adds to 
"ts equity capital and at present appears to be safer; however, the 
o ding compan ill now require dividends from the subsidiary in 
order to service the deb It is not difficult to imagine a situation 
in which hold1.ng company policies might conflict tvith the safe opera-
t •on o a subsidiary bank. 
Business r1sk may be defined as the dispersion in possible 
f uture returns, whereas financial risk denotes the dispersion in 
r tu ns available to common equity which is a result of the firm's 
. 1 . 1 2 part1cu ar ca 1ta structure. ~ When the amount of leverage employed 
in a firm is increased the financial risk to which the common 
1 For an accounting illustration of double leveraging see 
appendix A 
2 cGuigan and Moyer, Managerial Economics, p. 376-77. 
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shareholder is exposed is also increased. The level of financial risk 
utilized in the capital structure should be inversely related to the 
level of business risk inherent in the concern. The degree of 
financial leverage that a holding company or an individual bank can 
tolerate without threatening the safety of the bank is dependent upon 
the level of business risk . If bank holding companies are able to 
reduce the business risk of their operations through efficient diversi-
f~cation then the holding company is strengthened as Jell as the 
en r banking system. In general, the higher the level of business 
risk the lower should be the level of financial risk, all other 
factors held constant. 
CHAPTER V 
CAPITAL ALTERNATIVES 
What alternative means does an established commercial bank in 
Florida have for incrementing its capital account? The most obvious 
method is to simply sell additional shares of common stock, either to 
e ·sting owners or solicit new shareholders. If the new issue is sold 
above par value, the bank increments both its common stock and its 
surplus account The retention of all or some portion of after-tax 
earn ·ngs nll increase the equity capit.al account and the bank can 
alter its retention policy to help meet the need for capital growth. 
If a bank's propert- at book value is less than actual market value, 
a be adventageous for the bank to arrange a sale and leaseback 
of 1.t eal estate . When the sale price of assets is greater than 
the book value of these assets, the bank will add to its surplus 
account. Through this arrangement capital frozen in fixed assets can 
be converted to a liquid form that can support an expansion of loans 
and investments. Another method available to a state bank for raising 
additional capital is the issuance of preferred stock. Preferred 
stock is an equity and represents a permanent source of funds; 
accordingly, failure to make dividend payments does not threaten the 
solvency of the bank. Unfortunately preferred dividends are not tax 
deductable; that is earnings available to common stockholders are 
22 
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first reduced by the full amount of the payment to preferred. Finally, 
if supervisory authorities approve, a bank can issue subordinated notes 
and debentures. Debentures are long-term debt instruments which are 
not secured by a mortgage or specific property or a lein against any 
bank assets In the event of liquidation the subordinated feature 
g1ves the debenture a right or claim on assets only after other indebt-
~edness of the bank has been paid. Management should select the 
particular alternative or combination of alternatives based on the 
cost o alternat ·ve sotrces of funds, the anticipated return on new 
f unds present ark,et conditions and the bank's objectives. 
The hypothetical bank in table X illustrates the effect of 
ere enting capital from alternative source. The assumptions under 
h"ch this example was constructed are as follows: The bank currently 
has four h ndred thousand shares of common stock outstanding, $20 
par-value a d $2 million in surplus, undivided profits and reserves. 
fter all ope rat ng exp,enses but before taxes the bank earns 1. 25 per-
cent on total asse ts, the applicable tax rate is 30 percent. Assets 
total $150 million and the total capital account is 10 i llion, 
bank e aminers suggest the bank increase capital b u · ion. 
anagement must now decide among three alternati e eans of raising 
additional capital 
1. The bank may sell fifty thousan a e 
at $40 per share, a times earnings ratio f a r t ~ely 1 
2. Sell preferred stock with a 9 per e t di i e d rate 
3. Offe nonconvertible subordinated debentures ~v:ith a coupon 
1 rate of 9 percent . 
Following the new financing the bank has assets of $152 million and a 
total capital account of $12 million. If the financing is done with 
common stock the total number of shares outstanding will increase to 
24 
450 thousand . In table Y earnings per common share are altered through 
changes in earnings on total as.sets ,. the tax rate, cost of debt and 
the marke t value of common stock. 
ith the aid of the following algebraic equation some general 
conclusions can be drawn concerning the profitability of employing 
va ious sources of cap~tal funds . When a bank's capital consists 
entirely of common equ1ty we may express the return to common share-
holde s as: 
n = (R-x)(l-t) 
c 
where 
n = return on common stock (profitability) 
R - total operating revenue 
= total operating expenses 
c ~ common equity 
t = applicable tax rate 
Assume that a given amount of common equity is replaced with 
preferred stock, the equat ion becomes: 
rr == (R-x)(l-t) - (Kp)(P) 
c-p 
1Note that interest charges on debt securities are tax deduct-
ible, therefore the effective cost of procuring debt capital is lowered 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































EFFECT OF CHARGES IN BASIC VARIABLES ON 
EARNINGS PER COMMON SHARES 
27 
Additional Capital Financed with: 
Variable Changes* 
a Change 
Earnings on Assets r1se to 2.0% 
before taxes 
Earnings on ssets fall to .5% 
before ta es 
Tax Rate is 50% 
Tax Rate · s 0% 
Cost of Debt declines to 6% 
Cost of Debt ris ~es to 12% 
Co 0 Stock Price declines to 
$20/share 



































*Only the variable noted is permitted to change, all other 
var · bles are the same as shown in table X part II. 
where, 
P - preferred stock 
Kp = dividend rate of preferred 
From the equation we may conclude that as long as the dividend 
rate of preferred stock is less than the return on common stock, 
the replacement of common with preferred will 
c. 
increase. the return on common stock or profitability. 
If a s pec i f ied amount of common equity is replaced by debt 
capital, the equation becomes: 
rr = [(R-x ) (Kd) (D)] (1-t) 
c 
whe re , 
D = Debt capital or subordinated debentures 
Kd = coupon rate or interest ch.arg ~es on debt 
This formula t i on differ s from pref erred stock because of the tax 
advantage of debt; that is ,, t h e i nter est cost of debt is deductable 
from income before taxation . The replac ~ement of common equity with 




DEBT AS CAPITAL 
When additional bank capital is required, the substituting of 
debt for equity increases the risk exposure of the leveraging bank. 
Risk is increased because the capital debenture cannot help insure 
solvency by absorbing operational losses. In case of bankruptcy a 
fi 's losses are absorbed by both the creditors and owners of the 
bus~ness similarly, in the case of a banks failure both debt and 
equ"ty capital will be expired before the F.D.I.C. or depositors are 
endangered But operatin5 losses cannot be charged against debt except 
in the case of liquidat~on and therefore debt capital cannot reduce 
the r sk of bank failure. 1 Debt as well as equity will provide pro-
teet on to depositors when a bank is forced to close; however, when 
the f ncti n of c pital is intended to be the prevention of failure 
by absorbing losses, only equity accounts can be viewed as bank 
cap·tal. Considering the social cost of bank failure, it is obvious 
~hy growth in th use of capital notes and debentures is a potential 
problem. Future increases in the utilization of debt capital by 
commerical banks depends upon the characteristics which make deben-
tur s an attractive source of funds. 
1For an illustration of how losses are absorbed by equity 
capital see ppendix B. 
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dvantages of Capital Debentures 
1. The use of the capital debenture avoids the dilution of 
voting interest which will occur with the issuance of additional 
connnon stock; the existing owners are not forced to share their 
control when debt financing is employed. This can be an important 
consideration in the case of a closely held bank when existing stock-
holders do not want their voting positions compromised. 
2. Florida Banking code states that the unrepaid proceeds of 
sales o capital notes and debentures shall be considered as a part 
of th aggregate amount of capital and surplus in computing loan and 
nves ment li ~tation and in evaluating adequacy of capital of the · 
issu· g bank. 1 However, the Federal Reserve does not consider deben-
t res hen assess·ng bank capital adequacy and therefore only state-
chartere - non-member banks enjoy the benefit of counting debentures 
as an ·nerement to the level of capital. 
3. unds provided by capital debentures are of long maturity 
and ·n rease the ability of the issuing bank to make long-term loans. 
Long-term debt has a fixed maturity, therefore it does not 
greatly in rease t e need for liquidity reserves. 
5. Legal reserve requirements are not applicable to debentures; 
thus, t e total amount of funds generated through their sale are 
usable. 
6. Proceeds from the ale of debentures are not subject to 
deposit 'nsurance costs of the Federa Deposit Insurance Corporation. 
1Banking Code~ Florida Statutes Vol. 2, chapter 659.23. 
7. If a substantial increase in the price level occurs in the 
future it will benefit the bank that issues debentures since the 
incurred debt will ultimately be repaid with depreciated dollars. 
Disadvantages of the Capital Debenture 
1. When a bank markets long-term debt they run the risk that 
1.nterest rate changes may result in the securities becoming an expen-
sive source of funds. The inter ,est cost of debt sold today will be 
high with r~e.spect to rates accessible at a later date of interest 
1 
rates fall . For ~example, assume a bank sells $25 mil lion in deben-
tures, a one percent decline in the stated interest rate would mean a 
$250,000 p e- tax cost savings. Interest rate risk is unavoidable, 
but management can r etain a call provision which will permit the debt 
secur ·ties to b,e redeemed at 100% of t heir principle amount together 
with accrued interest to the date of redemption. To maintain flex-
ibil .. t in the financial structure of the bank and to minimize the 
r"sk of d clining interest rates, all debentures should be subject to 
redemption and the timing of the issue must be carefully evaluated. 
2. Debt capital has, a fixed maturity and management must make 
provsions for its repayment. Florida law requires that if capital 
debentures .ar~e not subject to obligatory prepayment of principal at 
l ~east annually the issuing bank shall establish and maintain a suit-
able sinking fund f or the amortization of the principle at the end of 
1conversly, if 1nterest rates rise the bank has secured funds 
at a relatively low price. 
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the third year from the date of issue. 1 
3. Debt involves a fixed charge which implies greater risk; if 
earnings fluctuate severely, the bank may not be able to meet these 
fixed charges. The larger the proportion of debt that is employed as 
an alternative to equity, the greater the risk of bank failure. If 
a bank becomes excessively reliant on debt to supplement its capital 
account, the risk to which depositors are exposed will increase sig-
nif · cantly. 
4. I though the debenture can strengthen the ability of the 
bank to meet customers' loan demands and to maintain deposit con-
vertibility , liability of the deb ~enture is limited and therefore it 
c not help prot ~ect the bank from technical insolvency. 
~anking Code. Florida Statutes, Vol. 2_, chapter 659.23. 
This sink"ng fund provision does not apply to debentures which are 
obligations of bank holding companies. 
• 
CHAPTER VII 
PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
In a study published in 1975 ,, by Heggestad and Mingo, it was 
hypothesized that the optimal level of capital in holding company 
1 
subsidary banks would be lower than for independent banks.. They 
reasoned that capital would be passed to the parent organization in 
the form of d~vidends since the holding company could then inv~est in 
oth ~er permissible activities, some of which are more profitable than 
banking. In addition to the profit incentive for transferring 
capital out of banking subsidiaries, such movement is al,so encouraged 
b regulations d~esigned to protect the affiliate.d bank. Capital held 
in the subsidiary bank is subject to a series of limitations regarding 
tr sfers · for example, dividends to the par~ent are tied to past 
earnings by regulation and bank loans to no~nbank subsidiaries are 
restricted in size. Therefore, capital held in a bank is not easily 
accessed by other subsidiaries whereas capital held in the parent or 
other subsidiary can be more readily transferred to the bank. Be ~cause 
the holding company may benefit by retaining its existing capital out-
s"de its bank subsidiary t he BHC-owned bank is also more likely to 
resi,st any regulatory pressure to increase bank c.apital. The pro-
portion that lower capital-asset ratios should be observed for 
1 Arnold A. Heggestad and John J. Mingo, ncapital Management by 
Holding Company Banks,u Jounral of Business 48 (October 1975): 500. 
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affiliated banks as tested utilizing a multiple regression technique 
based on models of capital investment in banking as described by Mayne 
1 
and Peltzman. Data for the model was computed from a sample of the 
365 largest banks in the nation; of these 248 banks were affiliated 
and 117 ·ndependent, while the banks ranged in size from $120 million 
to 22 billion in total deposits as of December 1972.. The empirical 
evidence provided by t he study leads to the conclusion that banks' 
cap a pos1tions decline when they become affiliated with holding 
co panies . 
study published in 1976 examined the hypothesis that holding 
company banks exhibit different asset portfolios, revenue and cost 
2 streams,and cap1tal structures t han independent banks. The study 
e ·n c th difference in behavior t .oward risk between the holding 
company affiliated bank and the independent, nonaffiliated bank 
z g a o i ary least-squares regression equation to estimate 
the i pact of e_plan tory variables on several performance ratios. 
The ost important resu l t of the experim,entation was that affiliated 
banks ere shown to have lower equity-capit.al-to-total-asset ratios. 
o differences in net-earnings-to-asset ratios between the two bank 
lasses er detected, implying that holding company banks exhibit 
1Lucille Mayne, "Supervisory Influence on Bank Capital," Journal 
of Finan e 27 (June 1972). 637-51; San Peltzman, "Capital Investment 
in Connnercial Banking and its Relationship to Portfolio Regulation," 
Journal of Poli ical Economy 28 (January-February 1970): 1-26. 
2John J. lingo, "Managerial Motives, Market Structure and The 
Performance of Holding Company Banks," Economic Inquiry 4 (September 
19 76) : 411-24. 
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higher earnings-capital ratios than do independent banks. It was also 
found that affiliated banks hold greater proportions of risky assets 
such as real estate loans and state-local issues. The study suggested 
that managers of affiliated banks tend to be more profit oriented than 
independent bank managers. The test included 250 independent and 134 
ho d'ng company banks in 9 unit banking states. The affiliated banks 
had deposits ranging from $63 million down to $3 million and only 
independent banks with deposits smaller than $70 million were chosen. 
case study conducted by Hoffman focused on banks acquired by 
to lorida ultibank holding companies between 1965 and 1973.
1 
In 
this ·nv stigation acquired banks were paired with similar sized 
'ndepe dent banks located in the same banking market to isolate the 
e fects of aff '1' ation on pe.rformance .. Data for the anlaysis obtained 
from a sam le of 13 paired affiliated and independent banks lead to 
t e cone ' U ion that neither holding company improved the capital 
position of 'ts acquired banks .. Subsidiaries of the first holding 
company h d a lower average capital account plus reserves per dollar 
of assets and per dollar of deposit than paired independent banks, 
both before acquisition and in 1974 but in absolute value the nega-
tive differential was much larger in 1974. The second holding 
company's subsidiaries had higher capital accounts plus reserves per 
dollar of ssets and per dollar of deposits than the paired 
1stuart G. Hoffman, The Impact of Holding Company Affiliation 
on Bank Performance: A Case Study of Two Florida Multibank Holding 
Companies (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlan.ta, ~'lor king Paper Series, 
January 1976). 
independents, on average, before acquisition; however, in 1974 these 




The investigation examines the hypothesis that Florida banks 
aff~l1ated with bank holding companies operate with less capital 
coverage ceteris paribus, than do independent banks. Acceptance of 
this hypothes~s would imply that affiliated banks assume a higher level 
of risk i banking, since bank equity capital is generally viewed as 
a safet cushion against operating losses. 
~Iethodolog· cal issues have been raised against early studies 
concerning the impact of holding company acquisition on the performance 
of acquir d banks. 1 These performance studies suffered from the fact 
that univariate analysis was employed to analyze a multivariate problem. 
The efore the assumption of ceteris paribus was violated and the 
results of these studies were at best problematic. Holding company 
banks ere evaluated before and after acquisition by selectively pair-
ing observations, affiliates were compared with a central group of 
unaffiliated banks, assuming that any differences in relative perfor-
mance would be due to the effect of holding company affiliation. 
Howev,er, in pair ·ng analysis, factors other than affiliation are not 
fully taken into consideration as determinants of an individual bankrs 
1Rodney D. Johnson and David R. einster, "An Analysis of Bank 
Holding Company Acquisitions: Some !ethodological Issues," Journal of 
Bank Research 4 (Spring 1973): 58. 
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cap tal position. For example, bank size and the level of earnings-
to-assets are important in determining capital levels, but these 
explanatory variables are omitted in univariate analysis. 
38 
Our hypothesis is tested utilizing cross-sectional regression 
analysis; a multivariate model is formulated to measure the effect of 
several explanatory variables on capital adequacy ratios. A multi-
variate technique is utilized to insure that the effect of holding 
company affiliation is isolated from other factors which influence 
cap1tal adequacy . Three capital-asset ratios are separately estimated 
by o d nary least squares regression. This study does not restrict 
the assessment of capital accounts to one measure, because it was 
ant·cipated that bet een the two bank classes any divergence in the 
level of capital coverage might be more significant when measured by 
one ratio as opposed to another . That is, the particular ratio 
s ected for evaluation mdght influence conclusions concerning the 
cap· tal adequacy of a particular bank and therefore, a particular 
group of banks 
The banks examined in this study were not randomly selected, 
alternatively informat~on utilized in testing the hypothesis was 
gathered from a cencus of the larger state chartered commercial banks. 
A mi or ty of banks in the state control a significant proportion of 
the total deposits held by state chartered institutions and for this 
reason banks were not randomly select,ed. It was felt that a study 
which concentrated on a high proportion of bank resources would be 
more mean· gful and provide greater insight in terms of the bank 
holding company movement. Institutions included in the census 
39 
controlled approximately 50 percent of the total deposits held by state 
chartered banks as of year end 1977. 
Because changes in bank management practices probably occur 
gradually after holding company acquisition, some period of time would 
be necessary in order for a parent company to institute adjustments in 
the balance sheet of a newly acquired bank. A previous study found 
that at least two years are required, following affiliation, before 
s~gnificant differences in performance can be statistically observed. 1 
The fore, only affiliated banks which had been members of a holding 
co pany for a minimum of four years were included in this investi-
. 2 ga 1.on. 
It has been show that there exist significant differences in the 
amount of cap·tal funds held by national, state Federal Reserve members, 
and nonmember banks when the influence of other factors are held 
3 constant Thus to reduce the influence on bank capital due to 
diff,er nt examining agencies, observations were restricted to state 
chartered banks. 
Assessment of capital adequacy is dependent, in part, upon those 
balance sheet accounts which are included in the definition of bank 
1Rodney D. Johnson and David R. Meinster, "The Performance of 
Bank Holding Company Acquisitions: A Multivariate Analysis," Journal 
of Bus·ness 48 (April 1975): 211. 
2The ime period was chosen arbitrarily largely to insure 
validity of the empirical tests. 
3Luc.ille S. Mayne, 'Supervisory Influence on Bank Capital," 
Journal of Finance 27 (June 972): 650. 
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capital. Utilizing the narrow definition, the first regression model 
evaluates capital adequacy as the ratio of equity- capital-to-risk-
assets·· that is, equity against those assets on which the bank 1s most 
lik·ely to suffer losses. The equity account includes: common and 
preferred stock, surplus, undivided profits and reserves for contin-
gencies. Risk assets are calculated by subtracting from total assets 
the sum of cash and balances due from banks, U.S. Treasury securities, 
federal unds ~old, and securities bought under resale agreements. Two 
dd.tional mod ls are constructed under the broader definition of bank 
cap· al, equit) plus long term debt (i.e subordinated notes and 
debentures) . The ratio of total-capital-to-risk-assets is examined in 
t e second model and in the third model total-capital-to-total-assets 
is he dependent variable. 
Data was obta1ned from the Florida Division of Banking 
December 31 1977 consol1dated reports of condition (State form 64) 
and consol'da d reports of income (State form 73). 
and 
Regression equations are based on those formulated by Heggestad 
. 1 
~ngo. 
Capital Adequacy ~del (1) 
ECRA = f(STA HCA, MEM, DDTD, DEP, CTA, NITA, SNDTC) 
where, 




estad and John J. Mingo, ncapital Management by 
Holding Compa y Banks," Journal of Bllsiness 48 (October 1975): 500. 
STA - the sum of cash and due, plus U.S., treasury securities, 
plus federal funds sold, as a percent of total assets. 
RCA = holding eompany affiliation,; a binary variable, 
affiliates = 1 ,, independents = 0 ,. 
41 
MEM - members of the Federal Reserve System; a binary variable, 
embers =, 1, non-members = 0. 
DDTD = demand deposits as a percent of t ~otal deposits; a measure 
of potential deposit volatility. 
DEP = total d~eposits; a measure of relative bank size. 
CT = percentage change in total assets over the past 2 years; 
a measure of the bank's growth. 
IT - net income as a percent of total assets. 
SNDTC - subordinated notes and debentures as a percent of total 
cap~ tal. 
Capital d quacy ~del {2) 
here 
TCRA = f(ST , HCA, MEM, DDTD DEP, CTA, NIT'A) 
TCRA = total capital as a percent of risk assets; a measure of 
capital adequacy . 
Capital dequacy odel (3) 
where, 
TCTA =-· f ( STA, RCA , MEM, DDTD, DEP , CTA, NITA) 
TCTA = total capital as a percent of total assets; a measure of 
capital adequacy. 
42 
Of the explanatory variables in the capital adequacy models, MEM 
is included to measure any influence on capital by Federal Reserve 
membership; STA is a measure of liquidity and portfolio risk; SNDTC is 
included because subordinated debt can be considered in the total 
capital account (debentures are expected to be inversely related to 
equity capital; NITA is included since as Mingo has stated, the amount 
'hich a bank can add to capital through retained earnings is dependent 
upon the level of current earnings and the level of capital is highly 
dependent on changes in capita1. 1 Total deposits are used as the 
determinant of bank size and are exp,ected to be positively related to 
capital levels but negatively related to the capital-asset ratios. 
Finally, the effect of holding company affiliation is incorporated in-
to each multiple regression equation through the introduction of the 
binary var1.able HC _.. The binary variable determines how holding 
company affiliation a qualitat1.ve independent variable, is related to 
the respective bank's capital ratio, t he quantitative dependent 
var1.able. 
The structure of Florida banking has undergone significant 
change in the past decade; the state has seen a greater increase in 
banks and deposits than the Southeast's other states. Because Florida 
banks have recently experienced such a rapid rise in total deposits 
and because earnings have been substantially depressed during the same 
period, the state's banks have been plagued with the problem of 
1John J. Mingo, "Capital Management and Profitability of 
Prospective Holding Company Banks," Journal of Financial and Quantita-
tive Analysis 10 (June 1975): 195. 
43 
acquiring sufficient equity capital to keep pace with the growth of 
their assets. Since most of the Florida bank stocks have been selling 
at 25% to 35% discounts from book value, these banks, like most other 
commercial banks in the nation, have found it unfeasible to raise equity 
1 capital in the last few years. Therefore, retained earnings and the 
issuance of a var~ety of debt instruments have been utilized in order 
to meet cap~tal needs.. 2 The increased issuance of debt capital has 
heightened the level of financial risk in a number of Florida banks. 
Debt capital, as noted in Chapter VI, cannot perform all the 
functions conventionally assigned to bank capital. The greater the 
proportion of debt in the capital structure of a bank~ the greater the 
risk of cash insolvency and thus, the risk of bank failure. A multi-
variate eq 'ation is employed to empirically examine the hypothesis that 
holding company affiliation significantly influences the utilization 
of deb b Florida banks . Two debt leveraging models are formulated 
to e amine . he usage of nondeposit debt funds by affiliated and 
independent banks . The first model examines strictly debt capital; 
the rat·o of subordinated-debentures-to-total-capital is expressed as 
a function of several explanatory variables. In the second model the 
usage of all nondeposit debt by the two bank classes is examined with 
the dependent variable be·ng all maturity-nondeposit-debt as a percent 
of total capital. 
1Allen C. Ewing and Co., Florida Bank Holding Companies 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Debt Leveraging Model (1) 
SNDTC = f(HCA, MEM, ECRA, CTA, DEP, DDTD, IBTOI) 
where, 
SNDTC = subordinated notes and debentures as a percent of 
total capital. 
IBTOI = incomes before income taxes and securities gains or 
losses as a percent of total operating income. 
Debt Leveraging Model (2) 
TDEC = f(HCA, MEM, ECRA, CTA, DEP, DDTD, IBTOI) 
here, 
TDEC = total nondeposit debt as a percent of equity capital. 
Total nondeposit debt is the sum of federal funds pur-
chased, s .ecurities sold to repurchase, liabilities for 
borrowed money, mortgage indebtness, acceptances executed 
by or for an account of the bank and outstanding, sub-
ordinated notes and debentures. 
Of the explanatory variables, all are the same as in the capital 
adequacy models e cept IBTOI. The IBTOI variable is utili.zed in order 
to quantify the debt servicing ability of commercial banks. Because 
the interest exp,ense on time deposits is a high proportion of total 
bank expenses and has priority over interest expense on long-term debt, 
Fichthorn found that when measured by the times interest earned 
multiple . b'l' 
1 
commercial banks demonstrated limited debt servic1ng a 1 1ty. 
~illiam H. Fichthorn, "Do Bank Capital Notes Merit Investment 
Stature," Financial Analysts Journal 23 (July-August 1967): 64. 
47 
Fichthorn proposes that instead, the ratio of pre-tax operating profits 
to gross. operating inc.ome constitutes a better measure of debt service 
ability out of bank income.
1 
CHAPTER IX 
STATISTICAL FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
An ind~vidual bank's ability to withstand periods of unfavorable 
economic. conditions is dependent, to a great degree, on the adequacy 
of its capital . The adequate level of bank capital is, however, 
diff1cult to quantify and a subject of much debate. Adequacy is a 
function of various factor s many of which are outside the control of 
management and this study does not attempt to determine that level 
which can be termed "adequate". The purpose of this study is to 
determine the impact of the holding company movement on bank capital 
positions. 
The regression coefficients and t-ratios for the capital adequacy 
models are presented ·n table x; the F ratios are significant at the 
99% level for all equations. The change in total assets over the past 
t¥lo years (CTA) and the level of bank earnings (NITA) are both signifi-
cant in the determination of capital levels. Growth in total assets 
has a negative impact on the dependent capital ratios and, as expected, 
the level of net income is positively related to capital adequacy. The 
regression equations show that validity of deposits, as measured by 
DDTD has a direct effect on the level of bank capital. 
The empirical evidence offered by this investigation indicat,es 
that there exists no statistically significant differences in the level 
48 
49 
of capital coverage, ceteris paribus, of holding company affiliated 
banks vis-a-vis independent banks. Therefore, it must be concluded 
that holding companies have not reduced the safety of Florida's state-
banking system through the under-capitalization of acquired banks. And 
further proliferation of holding companies does not appear to be a 
thr,eat to the adequacy of capital accounts. 
The usage of debt capital has important implications to the 
stability of banking markets. The solvency of a commercial bank is 
dependent upon levels of equity capital when operating losses are 
incurred and therefore, the ability of capital to absorb losses is 
impaired as the proportion of capital comprised by debt increases. The 
employment of debt funds also entails fixed charges which cannot always 
be eferred thus the increased utilization of debt capital raises the 
level of risk inherent in the respective bank. 
I n order to determine the effect of affiliation on the utiliza-
tion of debt two multivariate models are examined; regression coeffi-
ciants for the affiliation variable (HCA) are negative implying that 
affiliation is inversely related to the usage of debt; however, in 
neither case was the RCA variable significant at the 90% level. Unex-
pectedly the coefficient of IBTOI, the variable designed to measur~e 
the debt servicing capacity of commercial banks, is also inversly 
related to debt utilization. These curious findings may first, only 
be an indication that debt leveraging is being done within the holding 
company itself.. It can be anticipated that funds secured by the parent, 
through the issuance of debt instruments, would be passed on to the 
individual bank in some other form. Second, when additional capital is 
TABLE X 
Independents Capital Adequacy Regressions 

















ultiple r - square .4098 
F- rat·o 6.075 
t - ratios in parenthesis 





















are Dependent is SNDTC TDEC 
RCA -1.231 3.411 
(-1.126) (.831) 



























TABLE Y - Continued 
Debt Leveraging 
Independents Regressions 
are Dependent is SNDTC TDEC 
ECRA -.398 .260 
(-2.179)* (.379) 
CTA -.067 .261 
(-2.164)* (2.235)* 
DEP -.001 .006 
(-.752) (1.156) 
DDTD -.013 .127 
(-.680) (1.810) 




u t"p e r - square .2317 .2829 
F - r at · o 
t - ratios in parenthesis 
















required the aff1liated bank may also benefit from the parent company's 
innate capability to market equity and channel it to subsidiaries. 
Because the liquidity variable (STA) is shown to be significant 
and positively related to capital adequacy in the ECRA and TCRA models, 
the STA variable can be considered a proxy for assessing the risk 
posture of a particular bank. Conservative management is expected to 
maintain larger cash and near-cash balances, ceteris paribus, since 
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bank liquidity acts as a margin of safety in anticipation of unforeseen 
demands for funds. 
Based on the premise that STA is a proxy for management's risk 
posture, a final model is constructed to test the impact of affiliation 
on the liquidity variable. Again a simple least squares regression 
technique is utilized to test the impact of holding companies; coeffi-
cients and t ratios are presented in table Y. Affiliation (HCA) is 
not a sign ficant explanatory variable; however, membership in the 
Fede al Reserve system (MEM) is shown to have a positive effect on the 
liquidity measure.. The STA regressian equation provides further 
empirical evidence that affiliated banks are not assuming higher levels 
of risk; that is, affiliated bank management is not any less risk 




Assume a holding company and its subsidiary display the following 
capital structure: 
Bank Holdin 
Bank Stoc $20 $20 BHC Common 
Stock 
Subsidiary Bank 
Assets $100 $20 Equity 
Capital 
$80 Deposits 
The regulatory agency feels the bank is in need of additional 
capital and requests the bank to increment by $10. If the holding 
co pany uses double leveraging to comply with the request, the balance 
sheets will ap ear as follows: 
Bank Holdin 
Bank Stock $30 $20 BHC Common 
Stock 
$10 Long Term Debt 
Subsidiary Bank 
Assets $110 $30 Equity 
Capital 
$80 Deposits 
The ank has increased the amount of its equity capital, but the 
f nds were raised by leveraging the parent company. 
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APPENDIX B 
How Losses Are Charged Against Equity Capital 
Equity capital represents a permanent source of funds available 
to the bank which has been supplied by the owners. Shareholders not 
only participate in profits of the bank but they must also absorb 









Liabilities & Owner Equity 
Deposits 89 
Common Stock 5 
Reserves &. Retained Earnings 5 
Subordinated Debt 1 
100 
Assume the uState Bank" incurs an operating loss of $2 million; 
the bank will have an equal outflow of cash. The loss is charged 
against equity capital and the stockholders' claim against the bank 
are reduced; the loss is deducted from reserves and retained earnings. 














Assets Liabilities & Owner Equity 
Fixed Assets 5 Reserves & Retained Earnings 3 
Loans 65 Subordinated Debt 1 
98 98 
Example 2. 
Assume the "State Bank'' experiences an $8 million loan loss. 
The loss is charged against the bank's loan loss reserves and retained 
earnings. Because the loan loss i s larger than the reserve and 
etained earnings account, the remaining losses must be charged to 
common stock· that is, reserves & retained earnings account are 
reduced by $5 million and $3 million is deducted from the common stock 
accoun . The balance she,et no~v appears as follows: 
State Bank 
Assets Liabilities & Owner Equity 
Cash 15 Deposits 89 
Bonds 15 Common Stock 2 
Fi ed Assets 5 Reserves & Retained Earnings 0 
Loans 57 Subordinated Debt 1 
92 92 
In th's example the bank's equity capital was sufficient to 
absorb losses and protect depositors, but if losses had exceeded $10 
million the bank would have been forced to close. 
APPENDIX C 
Topics For Further Investigation 
This study has exposed some interesting areas which require 
further research. The source, uses and profitability of the capital 
debenture needs to be analyzed from six differing perspectives or 
objectives of interacting groups: bank regulators, bank management, 
d ,positors viewpoint, bank customers, bank competitors and bank 
common shareholders. The objectives of each of these individual 
groups influences the commercial bankrs objectives and as analysis 
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of po icies and procedures can be approached within this framework of 
influences. Useful financial information could be provided to the 
banking c mmunity through the examination of debt capital under the 
following criteria: 
1) prospective growth of commercial banks. 
) the stability of earnings. 
3) reliance on potential volitile sources of funds. 
4) quality of management. 
5) quality of assets. 
F"nally, an investigation into the benefits derived through diversi-
fication of the holding company could provide important implications 
in terms of the holding company movement (e.g., Has diversification 
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